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SECURITY ANALYSIS OF FINANCE AND 
HEALTHCARE ANDROID APPLICATIONS 
NEBIYU A. FELEKE 
ABSTRACT 
Android is a major mobile operating system pre-installed and shipped with more 
than 60% of smart-phones in the market. The open source nature of android en-
courages developers to innovate wide-range of applications. Meantime, the sweeping 
android acceptance with individuals and industries caught t he attention of malicious 
software writers, which led to a sharp increase of security threats. Such threats raise 
a deeper concern in financial and healthcare applications that are inherently bound 
to handle private and sensitive information. 
The research provides a deeper analysis on security vulnerabilit ies of android ap-
plications in finance and healthcare category, from official Google app store. It is 
proposed and implemented a security analysis framework that takes account of a 
wide range of vulnerability metrics to provide unified and quantified method of mea-
suring android applications vulnerability. The framework implementation automated 
the process of crawling google's app store, downloading applications package to a 
repository and conducting vulnerability analysis. It automatically extracts security 
parameters, measures vulnerability metrics and generates vulnerability report. The 
security parameters were extracted from manifest, de-compiled source code and app 
store meta-data. 
The analysis, on the top 632 free apps from finance and medical category revealed 
that on average financial apps found to be more vulnerable than medical apps. Med-
ical apps have the maximum value for all types of vulnerabilities. Furthermore, a 
descriptive statistical analysis on the vulnerability metrics revealed that there is a 
v 
linear relationship between implicitly open components and the number of times they 
access sensitive android resources. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
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Android is a major operating system that is pre-installed and shipped with more 
than 60% of smart-phones in the market, according to Gartner research institute 
online newsroom release. Gartner released a report on world wide mobile devices 
sales to end users by operating system and android extended its dominance in the 
mobile operating systems market by taking 64% of the market share (Gartner, 2012). 
The open source nature of Android encourages developers to innovate wide range of 
applications, which attributed to almost half-a-million apps found in Google's app 
store. The demand for these apps increased dramatically in the past few years. 
Android developers site announces proudly that android users have downloaded more 
than 25 billion apps from Google Play and claims a downloading rate of more than 
1.5 billion apps per month since 1Q of 2010 (Google, 2012). 
Android apps development is happening in all sectors including Finance and 
Healthcare industries, which are the main focus of this research. ( comScore, 2012a) 
says that "the rapid development in mobile technology led to unprecedented inno-
vations in financial services and the number of people using/ accessing these services 
from their mobile has increased, significantly." In 2012, there were 79% more people 
who used PayPal from their mobile than 2011 and 1 in 5 users purchased items on 
their mobile phones. Similarly, the number of people accessing health information 
from their mobile device has significantly increased in the U.S . ( comScore, 2012b) 
published that 16.9 million users in the U.S. accessed health information on their 
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device during the three month average period ending November 2011. It is a 125% 
increase from the previous year. 
The sweeping android acceptance by many individuals as well as industries draws 
the attention of malicious software or virus writers. Accredited anti-virus or anti-spy-
ware companies report that there is a significant increase in the number of reported 
threat samples targeting the android platform. Kaspersky released 3Q 2012 lab re-
port on the number of malware modifications targeting android OS and the number 
of Trojans targeting the android platform nearly tripled in the second quart er and 
doubled in the third quarter compared to the first quarter. In 2Q, 14900 new mali-
cious programs were added to their database and in 3Q, 9130 were added as compared 
to 5441 added in 1Q (SECURELIST, 2012). 
In the past few years research had been done to identify the underlying vulnera-
bilities of android system and propose a mitigating or a complete solution. Comdroid 
(Chin et al., 2011) identified vulnerabilities associated with android messaging sys-
tem. Sending and receiving unprotected implicit intents create a potential vulnera-
bility to the android system. For instance, when unprotected broadcast intent is sent 
eavesdropper can intercept the information by launching a dictionary attack on the 
intent-resolution mechanism. If the intent is sent with private data then the eaves-
dropper can steal personal information. Similarly, IPC inspection (Felt et al., 2011 b) 
discussed permission re-delegation vulnerabilities with android system. A malicious 
application which does not have a text message privilege could scan for a vulnerable 
application in the system and exploit it to send and receive text messages. 
It is contend that such kind of alarming threat reports and vulnerabilities raise a 
deeper concern in Finance and Healthcare applications which are inherently bounded 
to handle private and sensitive information. Therefore, 632 applications were down-
loaded from medical and finance categories and conducted a deeper analysis. Security 
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analysis frame work was implemented to automate the process of crawling Google 
Play, downloading applications package to a local repository and carrying out vul-
nerability analysis. Based on the analysis on average financial applications found to 
be more vulnerable than medical applications. On the other hand, medical applica-
tions have the maximum vulnerability. Furthermore, descriptive statistical analysis 
revealed that there is a linear relationship between the number of implicitly open 
components and the number of times they access protected android resources. 
In summary, our contributions include: 
• Android Application(s) Security Analysis Framework :- We proposed and im-
plemented a framework that can be used to extract and analyse relevant security 
parameters from android application(s) meta-data and package resources. The 
parameters were extracted from manifest XML file, classes.dex and app package 
resources. 
• Vulnerability measuring metrics :- We introduced a list of metrics that can be 
used to provide a quantifiable method to measure and evaluate application's 
vulnerability. 
• Apps keywords relationship to requested permissions:- We established a rela-
tionship between keywords that are found in apps Google Play description and 
permissions. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section (2) gives a high-level android 
system overview. Section (3) discusses android based systems vulnerabilities. Section 
( 4) introduces Automated Security Analysis Framework for android applications and 
its implementation. Analysis experiments and results are shown in Section (5) . 
Finally, future works will be discussed in Section (6) followed by conclusion in Section 
(7). 
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1.1 Thesis Statement 
Because accredited anti-virus companies reported a significant increase in t he number 
of threats targeting android applications and research have identified android system 
vulnerabilities, financial and medical applications vulnerabilities should be quantified 
and measured to asses their security risk. 
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Chapter 2 
Android Overview 
Android is Google's open source mobile operating system which has become popular 
in the past few years. In the following sections, Android software architecture will be 
discussed followed by android security mechanisms. 
2.1 Android Architecture 
Android is a software stack with Linux kernel at the bottom of the stack, Android 
Runtime with Dalvik virtual machine (DVM) and Java Core libraries in the middle-
ware and App framework with standard APis and Applications on top of t he stack, 
as shown in figure 2·1.(Android Developers, ). 
Android Middleware Android Runtim e 
~~~~ 
LinuxKernel 
Figure 2 ·1: Android system architecture 
Android was built based on Linux 2.6 hardware drivers and lower level memory 
management. 
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Dalvik is a register based virtual machine that runs classes compiled by Java 
language and converted to *.dex format. The *.dex format is a Dalvik executable 
format which maintains minimal memory footprint. 
The Application Framework provides system core applications whose capabilities 
are exposed to application developers with standard APis. The APis provide stan-
dard interfaces to telephony functionality, wifi, phone and media resources, location 
information, contact database and system wide notifications. Developers can reuse 
these system applications and build their rich and innovative applications on top. 
Android sandboxes applications. Each application runs in isolation from other 
applications with its own process and instance of Dalvik virtual machine as shown 
in figure 2·2. The system assigns a unique Linux User ID (UID) to each app. Each 
application will be a user process to the underlying Linux based Kernel. All the 
security rules assigned to the UID will consequently apply to the application. In 
general, android system is a multi-user system to the Linux kernel where each app is 
a single user. 
Android App 
Activities I r-::==l ·~ 
I Service(s) I ~ 
~ I Receiver(s) I 
I Provider(s) I 'IR-eso- uc-e--,sl 
[ Dalvik VM J 
Llnux User Process 
Figure 2·2: Sandbox application 
Android application IS composed of one or more components and resources as 
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shown in figure 2·2. Components are android core classes which serve as functional 
blocks of android application. There are four kinds of components and each one has 
a unique and specific task to handle. 
1. Activity Component: defines the user interface. Depending on the number 
of interfaces required, app can have one or more activities defined. 
2. Service Component: carries out long-duration processes at the background. 
It also provides RPC interface for other applications which might send com-
mands and retrieve data. 
3. Broadcast Receiver Component: receives system-wide announcement. The 
broadcast can be initiated by the system or android applications. It does not 
have a user interface but can create a notification on status bar for the user. 
4. Content Provider Component: provides and manages the interface to the 
SQL Lite relational database of the application. 
Android application architecture is designed to simplify the reuse of components. 
Components can publish their capabilities to the android system and provide services 
to other components or applications. For instance, an application which requires 
sending e-mail message can request the e-mail application to send its e-mail message. 
The communication between the applications is carried out by android messaging 
system that uses intent objects. 
2.2 Android Messaging system 
Intent object based messaging is used to perform a late run-time binding between 
components of application or different applications. Intents are object data structures 
which are used as abstract description of the operations that are carried out on the 
receiving components. They are are primarily composed of: 
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1. Actions: are set of string constants which specify the actions that are performed 
by the receiving component. For example, the string ACTioN_vrEW will activate 
the component to display the data that is passed with the data element to the 
user. 
2. Category is a string constant which specify additional information in order to de-
fine the type of component that should handle the intent. For example, the main 
entry to an android application is determined by action string ACTION....MAIN and 
category string ACTION_LAUNCHER. The combination of these strings defines the 
component to the android system as the main component which should be 
launched. 
3. Components explicitly specify the name-space of the component to which the 
intent message is intended to be sent. Component is an optional field which can 
be left unspecified. 
In cases, where the intent does not explicitly specify the destination address the 
android system uses intent resolution mechanism to implicitly determine the address 
of the destination component or package. The intent resolution mechanism uses 
intent-filters to identify components that can handle the capability requested by 
the intent. The resolution mechanism searches the system for component(s) with 
matching action, category and/or data to the intent message. When it finds a 
match, it forwards the intent request. When it finds two competing components from 
different apps with similar capabilities, it requests the user to choose the app which 
should handle the request. The user has the option to set a default app to handle 
similar requests. 
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2.3 Security Mechanism 
During application package installation, the package installer will assign a unique 
User-ID to the app package being installed. The application uses the User-ID on the 
device until it is uninstalled. Android operating system does not allow any two pack-
ages to run with same User ID unless their security is enforced with sharedUserid 
attribute in manifest file. Thereby, android enforces security on a process level. An-
droid applications are signed with a certificate that is privately signed by the app 
developer. Android uses this certificate to deny applications which request to share 
a Linux UID that is being used by any other application and to grant or deny appli-
cations access to developer signed app resources. 
The central design point of the android security architecture is that no application 
by default has the permission to access other application. When a sandbox application 
wants to access a peer sandbox application, the system enforces security using a fine-
grained mechanism called permission. The application that has an intent to use the 
service of permission protected application should have the right permission. For 
instance, in figure 2·3 the activity should have the right permission to access the 
permission protected service. 
2.3.1 Permission 
Android applications by default have limited access privilege to sensitive core re-
sources. The android system uses permission based security mechanism to protect 
these resources. The resources include camera functions , location data(GPS) , blue-
tooth functions, telephony functions, SMS/MMS functions and network/data connec-
tions (Android, ). They are only accessible through the operating system. App that 
requires to make use of these resources should make the corresponding permissions 
request in its manifest file . During app package installation android notifies the user 
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App-1 App-2 
I Activity 
I : ~ I Service I I 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
Request 
- {> Permission = Permission = ------
SECURE ME SECURE_ME 
Figure 2·3: Permission based security 
and depending on the permissions protection level, either requests the user to confirm 
or merely review the permission requests. 
Android provides four levels of protection with permissions. That is Normal, 
Dangerous, Signature and SignatureOrSystem. 
• Normal permissions protect resources that could cause minimal damage to the 
system if compromised. Android grants access to resources protected by normal 
permissions automatically. 
• Dangerous permissions protect sensitive android resources. Android grants ac-
cess to resources protected by dangerous permissions when the user confirms 
the permission request during app installation . 
• Signature permissions are granted to applications which are signed by the same 
developer. 
• SystemOrSignature permission are granted if the app meets t he signature re-
quirement or if the application is installed in the system applications folder. 
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Permission labels are pre-defined string constants in the android system. Android 
offers the flexibility of allowing developers to define their own set of permissions. Both 
the standard and developer defined permissions are specified in the manifest file with 
< uses-permission> and <permission> elements. 
2.3.2 Manifest File 
Android system applications publish their capabilities in their manifest file. A com-
ponent that is not defined in the manifest file will not be recognized by the android 
system and will not be working at runtime. Manifest is an XML file that must be 
found in the root directory of every application. It stores all the necessary information 
the system must have before running the application. The file stores the unique pack-
age name, components and their capabilities, access levels of components, permission 
requests, list of libraries and more as shown in figure 2·4. 
<manifest android:package = "edu.bu.met .thesis" > 
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET" I> 
<permission 
android :name="edu . bu.met.DEVELOPER_PERM", 
android:protectionlevel ="signature"> 
<uses-permission andro i d:name="edu . bu . met.DEVELOPER_PERM " I> 
<application> 
<activity android:name="edu . bu .met.MainActivity" 
android : permission="edu.bu.met.DEVELOPER_PERM " 
<intent-filter > 
<action 
android:name="android . intent.action.MAIN" I> 
<category 
android : name="android.intent . category.LAUNCHER"I> 
</intent-filter> 
</act i vity> 
</application> 
</manifest> 
Figure 2·4: Manifest file 
The manifest file in figure 2·4 , is for application package called edu. bu . met. thesis. 
The application has activity component called MainActivity which is the MAIN 
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class from which the app LAUNCHES. The application defines INTERNET permission 
which allows it to open network socket . The application is signed by the developer 
with a permission edu. bu. met. DEVELDPER_PERM. 
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Chapter 3 
Android Vulnerabilities 
In the past few years, many research groups have identified android system vulnera-
bilities such as over-privilege, open components, re-delegation, code loading and etc. 
After surveying on different published research papers the vulnerabilities discussed 
in the following sections were selected for the research. The research quantifies and 
measures these vulnerabilities with metrics and generates report on the magnitude of 
financial and medical android applications security risk. 
3.1 User-granted Permission Vulnerability 
Android notifies the user to confirm dangerous permissions request. It is possible that 
the user might not understand all the implications of the permission and confirm the 
request. Android tries to give brief description about the permissions to the user 
to make informed decisions. However, this does not help much as permissions have 
a wider scope and could be used for so many other things than their intended use 
at a particular instance. Malicious apps could exploit this vulnerability and gain 
unnecessary privileges at install time. (Enck et al., 2009a) 
3.2 Over-privileged Permission Request 
Developers should make least privilege permissions request. However, they were found 
to make over-privileged permissions request by requesting few extra permissions than 
they actually require. The main reasons were inadequate android API reference 
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documentations and lack of developer competence (Felt et al. , 2011a). 
3.3 Vulnerable Permissions Combination 
A list of vulnerable permissions combination was determined by (Enck et al. , 2009a). 
They identified list of vulnerable permissions combination that could potentially cre-
ate security risk to the system. The vulnerable combinations are taken from (Enck 
et al. , 2009a) security rules and they are listed in t able 3.1 
rule-03 
rule-04 
rule-05 
rule-06 
rule-07 
rule-08 
rule 
n app 1cation must not ave t e SET _DEBUG_ permiSSion a e 
An application must not have PHONE_STATE, RECORD_AUDIO , and INTERNET 
permission labels. 
An application must not have PROCESS_OUTGDING_CALL,RECORD_AUDIO , and 
INTERNET permission labels. 
An application must not have ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION, INTERNET, and 
RECEIVE_BOOT _COMPLETE permission labels. 
An application must not have ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, INTERNET, and 
RECEIVE_BOOT _COMPLETE permission labels. 
An application must not have RECEIVE_SMS and WRITE_SMS permission labels. 
An application must not have SEND_SMS and WRITE_SMS permission labels. 
An application must not have INSTALLSHORTCUT and UNINSTALLSHORTCUT 
ermission labels. 
Table 3.1: KIRIN rules (Enck et al. , 2009a) 
3.4 Open Component Vulnerability 
Open components are public components t hat can be accessed by other applications. 
A component becomes public when the exported attribute is explicitly set to 'TRUE' 
and alternatively defines intent-filters and leaves the exported attribute to the de-
fault value. Normally, the default value is 'FALSE'. However, to the android system 
the presence of at-least one intent-filter implies that the component is intended for 
external use and hence sets a default value of 'TRUE' to t he exported attribute. 
A security-aware developer should explicitly set the exported attribute to 'FALSE' 
for components intended to be private (Enck et al. , 2009b). If the component is in-
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tended to be public and accessed by other applications, then the developer should 
protect the component with Signature or SystemOrSignature permissions. 
Open components are considered as vulnerabilities as they open doors for mali-
cious applications. (Chin et al., 2011) introduced intent spoofing attack that can be 
launched on applications with implicitly open components. For example, if a broad-
cast receiver is implicitly open and blindly trusts an incoming broadcast intent then 
it becomes vulnerable to malicious attacks. 
3.5 Permission Re-Delegation Vulnerabilities 
Apps that have implicitly open component and make a call to protected android 
methods create vulnerability. Implicitly open component could become a deputy for 
malicious requester and be utilized by the adversary to gain access to protected API. 
Permission Re-delegation vulnerability with android system was introduced by 
IPC inspection (Felt et al. , 2011 b). IPC inspection states, "Permission Re-delegation 
occurs when an application with a user controlled permission makes an API call 
on behalf of a less privileged application without user involvement. The privileged 
application is referred as a deputy". IPC inspection proposes a mechanism to reduce 
the permissions of the requester to the intersection of the deputy and the requester 
permissions and serve the requester as least privileged. 
Permission re-delegation is illustrated by figure 3·1. A malicious application which 
does not have a text message privilege could scan for vulnerable application which 
has a privilege to send SMS and unprotected broadcast receiver. Then, the malicious 
app sends a broadcast request to this app and uses the app as a deputy to accomplish 
its task - even if it is not allowed to have any access. The main vulnerability here is 
that the intent receiver application made it's component public and unprotected. 
Requester 
Ponn =NONE 
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(2) Notify 
Phone Resource 
Figure 3·1: Permission re-delegation (Felt et al. , 2011b) 
3.6 Hidden Files Vulnerabilities 
A hidden malicious binary or executable files could be used to launch root exploits. 
Mostly, they do not occur but when t hey do they can cause serious damage (Apvrille 
and Strazzere, 2012). Therefore, app's package folder structure should be checked for 
sanity. 
3. 7 Code Loading Vulnerabilities 
Code loading vulnerabilities are associated with loading a native code or a class 
using DexClassLoader. A dynamically loaded code runs with the same privilege as 
the application. If t he code is loaded from a trusted source then there is no harm. 
However, it is possible that it is loaded from untrusted source, which at times could 
be a malicious source. For instance, (Zhou et al. , 2012) detected zero day malware 
plankton which loads its code and transports app's permissions over the network to 
a remote server. 
17 
Chapter 4 
Security Analysis Framework 
Security Analysis Framework is designed and implemented to extract and analyse 
security related parameters from multiple levels of android application(s). It extracts 
app meta-data from android app store and security parameters and their settings 
from manifest XML and Dalvik executable files. It collects these data, creates list 
of metrics that can be used to measure vulnerabilities and analyses the metrics to 
generate vulnerability report. 
4.1 Analysis Framework and Implementation 
The Security Analysis Framework implementation is illustrated by figure 4·1. The 
Crawler module is used to connect to the official Goggle servers and download appli-
cations. The downloaded applications packages are stored to local Repository. The 
Extractor is used to extract security parameters and settings pertaining to the vul-
nerabilities discussed in Chapter-3. Finally, the analysis module is used to carry out 
statistical analysis on the vulnerability metrics data and generate report. 
4.1.1 Crawler 
The Crawler module is implemented to automate the process of downloading android 
apks from official Coogle's app store. Naturally, the apk file can be retrieved in either 
of the two ways. One is to root the phone and the apk files can be retrieved from 
/data/app/ or system files from /system/app. The other is to use android application 
Coogle play 
jcrailer I 
Repository 
a 
.... ~ 
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Figure 4·1: Security analysis framework 
Analysis 
Engine 
REPORT 
backing up apps and back-up the application. The apk files can be retrieved from the 
back-up path. However, in both cases each application should be downloaded from 
Coogle app store to the phone so that apk files can be retrieved one by one to a PC. 
In order to come up with a better analysis and result we opt to manually download 
many applications. 
On the other hand, the Crawler module connects to official Coogle servers and 
downloads the application's apk file directly to a PC. The module is powered by an 
open source library called android-market-api(Alexandre, 2010) . It is an open source 
library which allows one to ask directly Coogle's official android market servers for 
information, search for apps, and etc. The Crawler module creates a wrapper class to 
the library and makes asynchronous call to apps in finance and medical categories. It 
downloads and stores app's meta-data to local database and apk file to the Repository. 
The app's meta-data information includes :-
1. Package name : is a unique name given to the app package. It is used to 
uniquely identify each application's package within Coogle's app database and 
in the local Repository. 
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2. Title : is a title given to the app by the creator. 
3. Version : is the current version of the package. 
4. Description : is a textual app description in Google Play. It is used to briefly 
describe the application to users. 
5. Downloads : is the number of times the application is downloaded from Google 
Play by different accounts( users). The highest number of downloads implies that 
the app got acceptance by many people. It is one metric that is used to establish 
app's popularity. 
6. Ratings : is the average score on a scale of 5 given to the app. It is calculated 
from the rating given by the app users. 
7. Rating Count : is the number of people who gave their ratings to the app. 
8. File size : is the file size of the application package. 
9. Creator : is the name of the developer who created the app. 
Finally, one challenge to the Crawler module was to be cautious not to alert 
Coogle's security mechanism by downloading many applications at one time with 
one account from the same IP address. Hence, the module is designed to retrieve 
incrementally ten apps meta-data and apk file at a time from specified category and 
sleep for few CPU cycles. It uses two Google accounts and downloads a maximum 
of 500 apps with each account in a day. One account is used to download finance 
category apps and the other is used to download medical category apps. 
4.1.2 Repository 
The apk repository is merely a local storage space for storing all downloaded ap-
plications package. The main reason for having a local repository is, the security 
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mechanism of Google does not allow to carry out extensive application analysis on-
line. 
Once the application packages were downloaded to a local storage they are de-
compressed and reverse engineered with a local script that uses (android apktool , 
2010). (android apktool, 2010) is an open source tool that reverse engineers 3rd 
party, closed and binary android apps. It decodes resources almost to the original 
form and rebuilds them after making some modifications . 
Currently, the repository stores 632 apk files. Each apk is reverse engineered and 
the corresponding resources are stored in a respective folder. The folders are named 
with the package name to uniquely preserve the package resources in the repository. 
4.1.3 Extractor 
The Extractor module extracts and stores security parameters and their settings 
from android packages. It extracts security parameters from manifest and Dalvik 
executable files and stores them to a local database. It has two main components: 
• The 'ManifestReader ' is a Java based tool that is implemented to extract se-
curity parameters and settings from the manifest file and store them to a local 
database. 
• The' androguard-ext' is a python based tool which is implemented as an exten-
sion to the Androguard (Desnos, 2011) tool. It parses Dalvik executable file to 
extract necessary security information pertaining to vulnerabilities mentioned 
in Chapter-3. 
ManifestReader : API is used to parse manifest XML file elements. The Main 
class searches for " AndroidManifest.XML" file in the folders and sub-folders of each 
app package in the Repository. Once it locates and loads the file, it instantiates a 
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"Manifest" class object. The "Manifest" class implements SAX for memory efficient 
XML parsing. It uses JDOM collections to recursively retrieve manifest elements 
together with their attributes and children. It returns a dictionary of security pa-
rameters and their settings for all elements. It implements the "SecurityParmFilter" 
class to filter out relevant security parameters and " InsertDatabase" to store them to 
a local database. The security parameters that are filtered from manifest XML file 
and stored to the local database are: 
1. Permission labels, 
2. Application element permission attribute setting, 
3. Components (activity, receiver, service, provider and their aliases) name to-
gether with exported and permission attributes setting, 
4. Intent-filters action and category strings together with external data sub-elements 
and 
5. Signature permissions 
Androguard-ext : is a collection of scripts that are implemented as an extension 
to the Androgurad tool. The scripts are used to extract security information from 
Dalvik executable file. 
Android applications are written in Java but run in Dalvik Virtual Machine 
(DVM). Dalvik is a register based virtual machine that runs classes compiled by 
Java language and converted to Dalvik executable ( dex) format. The dex file holds 
a set of class definitions and their associated adjunct data(Dalvik, ) . 
Androguard is a python based open source tool that reverse engineers apk file(s). 
It disassembles/decompiles the dex file and maps it to Python object. The androguard 
classes that were crucial to the implementation of android-ext are : 
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1. androguard. core. byte codes. apk. APK is used to decompress and access all 
elements of apk file. 
2. DVM API handles Dalvik executable file formats. The API loads, unpacks and 
decodes/interprets Dalvik executables according to official (Dalvik, ) format. 
The androguard. core. byte codes. dvm. Dal vikVMFormat class implementation 
loads and parses classes. dex file. It maps classes. dex file elements to python 
objects. It instantiates objects of other classes to unpack and decode dex file 
format elements. However, in the interest of simplicity the major classes are 
mentioned below: 
• androguard. core. bytecodes . dvm. Header Item is used to parse the" header_ 
item", 
• androguard. core. bytecodes. dvm. MapList is used to parse the" map Jist" 
and 
• androguard. core. bytecodes . dvm. ClassManager is used to access all el-
ements (strings, type , proto and field) of the dex file format. 
3. androguard. core. bytecodes. dvm . Instruct ion class represents Dalvik instruc-
tion set. 
4. androguard. core. analysis. analysis. VMAnalysis class is used to analyse a 
dex file. 
The androguard-ext module is a collection of scripts. Each script file is used to 
extract security parameters from the Dalvik file pertaining to the type of vulnerability 
that is scoped to test. The following scripts are used : 
1. Over Privileged Script: gets the requested permissions from the manifest 
file and checks their implementation in the Davlik code. If it detects extra 
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permissions request then it updates the Overprivilege table with the package 
name and permission ID. 
2. Redelegation Script: gets implicit open components from the manifest file 
and searches in the Dalvik code if they make a call to protected android meth-
ods. It uses the flowchart in figure 4·2 to determine implicitly open components. 
If it detects that an implicitly open component is making a call, then it updates 
the Redelegation table with the component ID and the protected method ID 
3. HiddenFolder Script: is an extension script that parses the application pack-
age folder structure and checks for suspicious hidden executable files. If it lo-
cates a file then it updates the database with the package name and the file 
path. 
4. CodeLoading Script: extends the package search method to check for native 
code-loading and dynamic code-loading. It searches the app dex file and checks 
if the app is accessing native code loading or dynamic code-loading packages. 
If it detects a call to any of these packages then it updates the database with 
the package name and the number of times it makes the calls. 
5. Database Script: database interface class which establishes connection to the 
local database and execute database commands. 
4.1.4 Local Database 
The local database serves as a local storage for all extracted security parameters 
data from apps manifest xml file, Dalvik executable file , package resource and app's 
meta-data. It keeps these data for post processing by the analysis module. 
The database architecture is organized in four groups. The first group of the 
tables stores app store meta-data, which are mentioned in the Crawler subsection. 
F 
T 
F 
component 
24 
F 
F 
F 
Not 
Implicitly open 
component 
Figure 4·2: Implicitly open component flowchart 
25 
::J --- ., 
I 
ke'r'W'Of"d VARCHAR(255)1 
lrequancy BU31NT(11 ) 
::J ...._.. ·~ I packaOf VARCH.1,A(25S) l .. • lw!yword VARCHAA(2 5SJ 
1 
til le VAACHAA(2S5) 
pac~ VARCHAA(255) 
119rs ion VARCHAFI (l2} 
dHCI\lfion TEXT 
., 
1 
1 
1 
runllownbeds VAACH AR(32 ) 1 
ratng VAACHAA( 16) 
rating Count VAAQ-iAR(32 ) 
ca1egory VAACHAA(32) 
neSize VAACHAA(32} 
anJO r VAACHAA(~5i 
, l"'ter1DateT1MESTAMP 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
I 
Figure 4·3: First group of tables 
The tables are shown in figure 4·3. The 'Root' table called "AppsMetadat" keeps 
unique app entry to the whole database. The "Keywords" table stores the filtered 
app's keywords. 
The second group of the tables stores information extracted from the manifest 
XML file. The tables are shown in figure 4·4. The "Components" table keeps com-
ponents security information, "Intent-Filters" table keeps component's intent-filters 
data, "Permission" table keeps permission label strings, "Action" table keeps stan-
dard action strings, "Category" tables keeps standard category strings, and "AppSe-
curity" and "SignedPermission" tables keep all the data related to signature permis-
sions. 
Third group of the tables stores information retrieved from Dalvik executable file 
format. The tables are shown in figure 4·5. The tables keep list of protected android 
methods and the app classes that access protected methods. 
The fourth group of the tables stores data pertaining to vulnerability metrics. The 
tables are shown in figure 4·6. Each table is used for storing metrics data to measure 
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1. "PermKeywordMap" table stores keywords to permissions association 
2. "PermCombTable " table stores data pertaining to permissions combination vul-
nerability 
3. "OverPrivileged" table stores information pertaining to over-privilege vulnera-
bility. 
4. "ImplicitOpen" table stores information pertaining to implicitly open campo-
nent vulnerability 
5. "ReDelegation" table stores information pertaining to redelegation vulnerability 
6. "HiddenFiles " table stores data pertaining to hidden code loading vulnerability 
7. "CodeLoading" table stores data pertaining to code loading vulnerability 
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4.1.5 Analysis Module 
The Analysis module gets vulnerability metrics data from local database and car-
ries out statistical data analysis. The "AnalysisModule" collects metric data from 
multiple metrics tables and generates vulnerability report. 
Vulnerability metrics statistical data reports are generated by using MySQL and 
R scripts. The various metrics reports are analysed manually to interpret the results. 
Currently, different approaches and analysis algorithms are being tested. Once, a 
suitable algorithm is identified then the module will be fully automated. 
Furthermore, the following additional analysis modules were used for keyword-
permission associations analysis and KIRIN security violation analysis. 
Keywords Heuristic Analysis Module : Apps description is one of the App 
meta-data downloaded and stored to database by the Crawler module. The textual 
description is retrieved from the database and processed using Keyword Heuristic 
analysis module. The module sanitizes and cleans the textual description to be al-
phanumeric text. The sanitized text is scanned to create a list of tokenized words. 
Then a list of keywords are filtered out from the tokenized words list by filtering out 
stop-list words. 
The module keeps the keywords and their association to apps in a local database. 
It keeps only single associations between a keyword and an app in local database. If 
the keyword is used more than once in the app description then the module updates 
the keywords frequency counter. The counter increments by one for each keyword 
repetition. The frequency counter is used to keep another dimension of the keyword 
usage and keep track of how many times the keyword is mentioned in the app store; 
thereby indicating the persistent usage of the keyword. 
The core of the heuristic analysis is to recognize a correlation pattern between 
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permission labels and keywords in order to establish relationship. The module creates 
correlation between the list of keywords and set of permissions requested by the app. 
It counts the number of apps that maintains similar association between a certain 
keyword and permission label. It heuristically recognises the association patterns 
and establish a relationship. The relationship will be used to automatically verify 
whether the app made a proper privilege request or not. 
Permissions Combination Analysis: "Kirin-SecurityRule" class checks whether 
KIRIN security rules were violated or not. For each app in the repository, it gets a 
set of permissions requested by the app and check the set if it contains a subset of 
the permissions combination found in KIRIN rules. If it detects the app contains a 
subset of permissions which matches to the KIRIN security rule, then it increments 
the violation counter and update the local database. It stores the package name and 
the violated rule. The frequency of the rules per package indicates the number of 
KIRIN security rules violation. 
4.2 Metrics 
These metrics are defined after surveying multiple research papers and closely study-
ing the android system. The following metrics are identified to evaluate the vulnera-
bilities associated with android applications: 
Keywords and Permission association : is a metric that counts the number of 
applications that maintain similar associations between a keyword and a permission. 
The counter provides a unit to measure the association strength between a keyword 
and a permission label. 
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Vulnerable Permissions Combination : is a metric that counts the number of 
KIRIN security rules violations. The violation counter provides a measuring unit to 
evaluate application's vulnerability. 
Over-Privileged Permissions Request : is a metric that counts the number of 
extra permissions requested by application. The number of extra permissions provides 
a measuring unit to evaluate the depth of over-privileged vulnerability. 
Open Component : is a metric that counts the number of open components de-
tected. The count of open components is used as a measuring unit for open component 
vulnerability. 
Re-delegation : is a metric that counts the number of unique protected android 
methods accessed by implicitly open component(s). The protected method call counter 
provides a measuring unit to evaluate application's exposure tore-delegation vulner-
ability. 
Hidden File : is a metric that counts the number of suspicious executable files de-
tected in the app package structure. The metric keeps the count of unique executable 
files detected. 
Code Loading : is composed of two metrics: 
1. dynamic code loading metric counts the number of times DexClassLoader class 
is accessed 
2. native code loading metric counts the number of times a native code is loaded 
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Chapter 5 
Applications Analysis Result 
The security analysis framework is used to analyse the 632 applications from finance 
and medical categories. The framework was used to extract security parameters 
and settings from multiple levels of android applications in the Repository. The 
extractor module filters out and stores security parameters and settings pertaining to 
the vulnerabilities discussed in Chapter-3. The Analysis module collects vulnerability 
metrics from local database tables and analyses them statistically. (These data can 
be accessed with the link http: I /met-mobile . bu. edu/appsecureanalysis/data/). 
The analysis result for each vulnerability metrics will be discussed accordingly. 
Each application in the Repository was checked for the vulnerabilities discussed in 
Chapter-3 and measured with the metrics discussed in Section 4.2. The report for each 
application in the Repository was plotted to show the distribution of vulnerabilities 
with the applications in the Repository followed by category based analysis of medical 
and financial applications. Finally, the most commonly exposed android resources 
were analysed and tabulated for each vulnerability analysis. 
5.1 Keyword and Permission Association Analysis 
For each applications in the repository a list of keywords is extracted from app's 
description and associated to a list of app's permissions. Using the analysis framework 
it is determined t hat 62 out of the 130 officially documented permission labels by 
(Android Developers , ) were used by these apps. The usage of these permissions 
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is calculated by taking the percentage of apps(in the Repository) requesting them. 
The top 10 most commonly used permission labels are summarized in table 5.1. 
Similarly, 8780 distinct keywords were extracted from these apps and added to the 
local database. 
Permission 
INTERNET 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATIDN 
READ_FHONE_STATE 
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 
CAMERA 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 
VIBRATE 
WAKE_LOCK 
Usa e 
94 0 
73% 
46% 
40% 
36% 
33% 
25% 
21% 
19% 
16% 
Table 5.1: Top ten most commonly used permissions 
The analysis effort focused on establishing strong association between keywords 
and permissions. Therefore, it calculates the most commonly used permissions and 
keywords with keyword-permission association greater than 10%. This effectively 
reduced the 8780 x 62 association matrix data to a relatively smaller matrix which has 
data for top 10 commonly used permissions and list of keywords that have keyword-
permission association greater than 63. Finally, it was possible to establish relevant 
association between keywords and permissions. 
The permission and keywords association for finance and medical categories are 
shown in figure 5·1 and figure 5·2, respectively. Some keywords intuitively break 
along the category line. 'BANKING', 'ACCOUNT(S)', 'BALANCES' , 'TRANSFER', 
'BILLS', 'CREDIT', 'FUNDS' and 'MONEY' were found in finance category whereas 
'HEALTH', 'MEDICAL', 'CARE', and 'PATIENT' were found in medical category. 
Other keywords showed interesting traits of each category. For instance, the keyword 
'SECURE' was found in finance category and strongly associated with INTERNET per-
mission. This implies that finance category apps focus on security. The keywords 
33 
'SUPPORT', 'QUICK', 'TIME', 'EASY' and 'SIMPLE' were found in medical appli-
cations. 
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Figure 5·1: Finance category apps keywords to permissions associa-
tion 
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Figure 5 ·2: Medical category apps keywords to permissions associa-
tion 
The keywords 'FIND' and 'ACCESS' were strongly associated with INTERNET 
and LOCATION based permissions in both categories. Similarly, the keywords 'VIEW' 
and 'ONLINE' in finance , 'SEARCH' and 'DOWNLOAD ' in medical categories were 
strongly associated with INTERNET and LOCATION based permissions. 
On the contrary, it was observed that some keyword-permission associations show 
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that app descriptions do not provide adequate information to the user. For instance, 
the CAMERA permission is associated with 'MOBILE' and 'BALANCES' keywords. 
Both of these keywords do not intuitively express the use of camera functionality. This 
increases the vulnerability that users confirm permissions request without fully un-
derstanding the implications of the permissions request . The app description should 
be improved to consistently reflect the purpose of the permissions request. Thereby, it 
can help to minimize the risk associated with user-granted permissions vulnerability. 
Furthermore, Google can devise a mechanism to enforce developers make the 
app description more informative and explanatory to the purpose of each permission 
request. While uploading app to the app store, Google can use keyword-permission 
association to check the app description consistency in explaining/expressing the 
purpose of permissions request. 
5.2 Over-Privileged Permission Analysis 
The over-privileged perm1ss1on request analysis is a descriptive statistics analysis 
on the data retrieved by 'OverPrivileged' python script. The module extracted the 
permissions request from the manifest file of each app and cross-checked in the dis-
assembled Dalvik code whether or not the application used these permissions. If a 
permission was requested but not used then the app is recognised over-privileged app. 
The analysis is conducted on a total of 632 apps from medical and finance categories. 
In order to determine the characteristics of the applications that make extra per-
mission requests, statistical analysis was done on the overprivilege metric data-set. 
The result of the analysis is summarized in the figure 5·3. Figure 5·3 (a) shows 
the number of extra permissions requested by each app package (The vertical axis 
is the count of permissions and the horizontal axis is the package ID). Figure 5·3 
(b) summarizes the permissions request relative frequency (The horizontal axis is the 
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Figure 5·3: Over-privileged permission request plot: (a) Permission 
vs Packages; and (b) Relative frequency. 
permissions frequency and the vertical axis is the relative frequency). 
The maximum number of extra permissions requested by the apps in the repository 
is 8 and its relative frequency is 0.15%. The median permissions request is 1 and the 
mean permissions request is 1.6 (approx. 2). Both the mean and the median have a 
relative frequency above 25%. 
Furthermore, the applications were grouped into their respective categories and 
analysed. The result of the analysis is summarized by a box plot of medical and 
financial apps as shown in figure 5·4. 
Comparing the two categories on average financial apps make more over-privileged 
permissions request than medical apps. However, medical apps request maximum 
number of over-privileged permissions. 
Finally, the most commonly requested over-privileged permissions have been anal-
ysed. For each over-privileged permission, the percentage of applications that make 
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Over-privileged Apps per Category 
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Figure 5 ·4: Over-privileged permission request per category 
t he permission request have been calculated. The top 10 permissions are summarised 
in table 5.2. The WRITE__EXTERNALSTORAGE permission is the most commonly re-
quested over-privileged permission and is requested by 45% of apps from all apps in 
the repository . 
Permission 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_sTQRAGE 
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 
CALLPHONE 
RECEIVEJ300T_COMPLETED 
ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS 
READJ?HONE_STATE 
ACCESS_WIFI _STATE 
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION 
GET _.ACCOUNTS 
CAMERA 
Usa e 
45 0 
31% 
14% 
12% 
8% 
4% 
3% 
3% 
3% 
3% 
Table 5.2: The most commonly requested extra permissions 
It was also confirmed that most of t he permission labels in the table 5.2 are 
consistent with t he 10 most common extra permissions that are identified by (Felt 
et al., 2011a) . 
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5.3 Vulnerable Permissions Combination Analysis 
The permission combination vulnerability analysis was done to determine whether 
or not the apps in the repository violate KIRIN (Enck et al. , 2009a) security rules. 
A set of permissions requested by each app was extracted from manifest file and 
tested against (Enck et al. , 2009a) vulnerable permissions combination. If a set of 
permissions is found to be a subset of the vulnerable permissions combination, then 
the set is considered as a vulnerable set and the app that has the set is considered as 
a vulnerable app. 
All the apps in the repository were checked and 5% of the apps violated either one 
or two of the security rules. In terms of category breakdown, 75% of medical apps 
and 25% of financial apps violated at-least one of the security rules. The number of 
apps violated KIRIN rules from both categories are summarized in table 5.3 
rule-04 only 
rule-05 only 
both rules 
Finance 
g 
5 
Medical 
l 
5 
18 
Table 5.3: Number of apps violating KIRIN security rules 
Furthermore, analysis was done in order to determine the most commonly vio-
lated rule(s). The analysis result showed only rule-04 and/or rule-05 were violated. 
Rule-04 states that an application must not have ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION, INTERNET, 
and RECEIVLBOOT _COMPLETED permission labels. Rule 05 states that An application 
must not have ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, INTERNET, and RECEIVE_BOOLCOMPLETED 
permission labels. 
(Enck et al. , 2009a) "assumed" that a location tracker malware can potentially 
use RECEIVLBODT _COMPLETED permission to receive broadcast and start when t he 
system boots. The permission RECEIVLBOOT _COMPLETED is a normal permission and 
does not have security implications. Location based and internet permissions are 
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most commonly requested permissions. It is more likely that they can be requested 
together by many applications. The fact that RECEIVK.BDOLCOMPLETED does not 
pose security threat and only 5% of the apps were found to violate the security rules, 
it was concluded that the metric does not yield strong result and can be ignored. 
5.4 Implicitly Open Components Analysis 
Implicitly open component vulnerability analysis was done to analyse implicitly open 
components for each app in the Repository. Implicitly open component is a compo-
nent that defines intent-filters but neither protected by developer signed permissions 
nor explicitly set exported attribute to 'false' . The frame work extractor module 
extracted components, components access level and capabilities, and signature or 
signatureOrSystem permissions from the manifest file of each app and stored them 
to the local database for implicitly open component analysis. 
The analysis was done on activity, receiver and service component types. Provider 
components were excluded from implicitly open component(s) analysis as they do not 
normally publish their capability with intent-filters. Moreover, the main component 
of each app was excluded in the analysis. Main component is an entry point to the 
app and normally should be accessible from the outside world. 
The result of the analysis is summarized in the figure 5·5. Figure 5·5 (a) summa-
rizes the number of implicit open components for each app package( the vertical axis 
is the number of implicitly open components and the horizontal axis is the package 
ID). Figure 5·5 (b) summarizes the implicit open components count frequency (the 
horizontal axis is the implicit open components count frequency and the vertical axis 
is the relative frequency) . 
The maximum number of implicitly open component was 51 and has a relative 
frequency of 0.15%. The median is 0 and the mean is 1.104 (approx. = 1) implicitly 
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Figure 5·5: Open components plot: (a) Open components vs Pack-
ages; and (b) Relative frequency. 
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open components. Both the median and mean have a relative frequency above 80%. 
Furthermore, the applications were grouped into their respective categories and 
analysed. The result of the analysis is summarized by a box plot of medical and 
financial apps as shown in figure 5·6. 
Comparing the two categories, on average financial apps have slightly more implic-
itly open components than medical apps. However, medical apps have the maximum 
number of implicitly open components. 
Finally, the most commonly exposed component types per category have been 
analysed. For each component type the percentage of applications that exposes the 
component have been calculated. The number of implicitly open components that 
were found in both categories is summarized in the table 5.4 
Activity components were mostly made open by apps from both categories. 7% of 
all the applications' activities were found to be open activities. The receiver compo-
40 
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Figure 5·6: Open components per category 
Category I Component Type I Open Components 
Finance I activity I ~~ 
. receiver . 
Medical I activity I ~~ 
. receiver . 
Table 5.4: Open components 
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nents follow the activity components with 3% of the receivers being left open. Service 
components were not found to be exposed at all. 
5.5 Permission Re-delegation Vulnerability Analysis 
The re-delegation vulnerability analysis was done to analyse apps that access pro-
tected android method(s) by using implicit open component(s). The framework ex-
tractor module parses the disassembled Dalvik code of apps which are found to have 
at-least one implicit open component in their package and checks if the app makes 
a call to protected android methods using implicitly open component. The app that 
makes a call to protected methods using implicitly open component is considered as 
a vulnerable app. The vulnerable app package name and the protected method(s) 
are stored to the local database. 
A total of 140 apps in the repository were found to have at-least one implicit open 
component in their package. 113 (80%) of these apps were found to access protected 
android methods. Statistical analysis was done on the 113 apps (with at-least one 
implicitly open component) and the result is summarized in figure 5·7. Figure 5·7 
(a) shows the number of method(s) call by each package components (the vertical 
axis is the number of call and the horizontal axis is the package ID). Figure 5· 7 (b) 
summarizes the number of method calls relative frequency ( the horizontal axis is the 
protected method(s) call and the vertical axis is the relative frequency) 
The maximum number of method(s) call is 292 and has a relative frequency of 
0.15%. The median is 0 and the mean is 5.921 (approx. 6) method(s) call . Both the 
median and the mean have a relative frequency above 80%. 
Furthermore, the applications were grouped into their respective categories and 
analysed. The result of the analysis is summarized by a box plot of medical and 
financial apps as shown in figure 5·8. 
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Comparing the two categories, on average financial apps have slightly more per-
mission re-delegation vulnerability than medical apps. However, medical apps make 
the maximum number protected methods call. 
Finally, the most commonly accessed protected android methods have been anal-
ysed. It was found that mostly the content, view and app packages pertaining to 
intent, view and activity classes were found to be called by implicitly open com-
ponents. The top 10 protected android methods which were found to be called by 
implicitly open components are shown in the table 5.5. 
Protected Method 
android.content . Intent.<init> 
android.content . Intent .putExtra 
android.content.Intent . getStringExtra 
android.view.View.getid 
android.content . Intent . getExtras 
android.app.Activity.<init> 
android.app.Activity.onCreate 
android.content . Intent.getData 
android.content.Context.getResources 
android.view .View.findViewByid 
0 
Table 5.5: Most commonly called protected methods 
The intent based package was found to be mostly accessed by the majority of 
implicitly open components in both categories. 51 % of the implicitly open com-
ponents found to make a call to intent object android. content. Intent. <ini t> . 
A sizeable percentage of implicitly open components tend to make calls to intent 
data and extended data handling methods. android. content . Intent. putExtra, 
android.content.Intent . getStringExtra and android.content.Intent.getData 
are used for either setting or retrieving intent data. 
The packages for activity components are also found to be in the table 5.5. The 
android . app.Activity.<init> and android.app.Activity.onCreate are used to 
initialize activities when activity starts. The other package that is commonly accessed 
by implicit ly open components is View. The access to View P ackages pose less security 
44 
threat as they are used for retrieving view ids. 
5.6 Hidden Executable Files Analysis 
The hidden files analysis examines the folder structure of apps package in order to 
determine the use of hidden, dangerous and malicious files. For each app in the 
repository the framework extractor module decompressed the package and searched 
for the presence of files with extensions listed in http: I /www. file-extensions. org/ 
as dangerous and malicious. Even though the file extensions *.js , *.png and *.gif 
made it to the list, the analysis excluded them as they are commonly used by android 
applications. 
The result of the analysis is summarised with figure 5·9. Figure 5·9 (a) shows the 
number of unique files t hat were found in each app package (the vertical axis shows 
the number of unique files and the horizontal axis shows package ID) . Figure 5·9 (b) 
summarizes the relative frequency of these files count (the horizontal axis shows the 
files count frequency and the vertical axis is the relative frequency). 
In financial apps package, a total of 109 file extensions were found whereas in med-
ical apps package 42 extensions were found. Table 5.6 summarizes the file extensions 
found in the packages of apps. 
file extensions 
.class 
.zip 
.dll 
.bin 
.llll 
.eml 
.swf 
.vsd 
occurrence 
56 0 
22% 
13% 
3% 
3% 
2% 
1% 
1% 
Table 5.6: File extensions most commonly found in packages 
The extension *.class is predominantly found in financial applications package. 
56% of the extensions are *.classes and they are found in 5 financial apps package. 
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Figure 5·9: Hidden executable files plot: (a) Hidden file(s) vs Pack-
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17 
The class files are associated with classes. com. face book . android package files. 
Similarly, in two financial apps packages paypal binary files were located. Finally, in 
one popular banking app with a download rate of more than 250000, test. bin file 
was found in its package. 
5. 7 Code Loading Analysis : 
The code loading analysis determines whether the application makes use of native 
code loading and/ or dynamic code package ( dal vik. system. DexClassLoader). If 
any of these packages are accessed by the application then the call counter counts the 
number of times the application makes a call. The results are shown in figure 5·10 
and 5·11 for dynamic code loading and native code loading, respectively. 
The result of code loading analysis could not be conclusive. Statically checking 
whether or not the application is accessing these packages was determined to be 
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2 
inadequate for measuring vulnerability. Further analysis should be done at run-time 
and ratify the vulnerability. 
5.8 Collective Analysis of Vulnerabilities 
Collective analysis was done to analyse the correlation between the vulnerabilities 
discussed in preceding sections. In order to visualize their relationship the plots from 
each sections are collected and plotted side-by-side in figure 5·13 
It was observed that there is relatively strong correlation between the number of 
implicitly open components and the number of calls to protected methods by these 
components. They showed linear correlation where larger count of open components 
are related to larger number of protected method( s) call. The correlation is shown in 
figure 5·12 
Another observation was on the ratio of the number of over-privileged applications 
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to the number of applications that made correct permission request. For the permis-
sions in table 5.2 the number of applications that made a correct permissions request 
were computed and added as# Apps colon in table 5.7. The colon Delta in table 5.7 
shows the difference between the total sum of applications requesting permissions cor-
rectly and the total sum of applications requesting extra permissions. Consequently, 
it can be inferred from table 5.7 that the top 5 extra ·permissions were not used by 
any of the applications in the repository. For instance, WRITLEXTERNALSTDRAGE was 
requested by 289 apps and the Delta shows that all of them are requested unneces-
sarily. 
Finally, It is not believed that all permission requests could be over-privilege per-
mission requests as in the case of table 5.7. It is contend that these results can 
be improved by using the latest permission map called PSCOUT (Au et al. , 2012). 
PSCOUT is permission map for multiple versions of android and improves the STOW-
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Figure 5·12: Open components and protected method(s) call Corre-
lation 
Extra Permissions 
RITLEXTER L_ T R E 
ACCESS_COARSEJLOCATION 
CALL PHONE 
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 
ACCESSJLOCATI ON_EXTRA_COMMANDS 
READ_FHONE_STATE 
ACCESS_WIFI _STATE 
ACCESS_FINEJLOCATION 
GET _ACCOUNTS 
CAMERA 
199 
88 
76 
49 
28 
22 
20 
18 
16 
209 
89 
77 
49 
230 
131 
250 
60 
155 
Table 5. 7: Permissions vs Extra permissions request 
10 
1 
1 
0 
202 
109 
230 
42 
139 
AWAY mapping. The 'over-privileged python script is dependent on STOvVAWAY 
permission map which is done for one android version (android version 2.2). 
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Chapter 6 
Future Work 
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A security analysis frame work implementation was proof of concept to test the idea 
of evaluating android vulnerabilities based on quantifiable metrics and analyse them 
statistically. Currently, the frame work implementation covers vulnerabilities associ-
ated with android permissions and components. In the future, it is planned to extend 
the frame work to cover vulnerabilities associated with the android messaging system 
and private data handling. The analysis of vulnerabilities associated with intents and 
private data can be carried out using control flow and data flow static code analysis, 
respectively. 
Descriptive statistical analysis of vulnerability metrics data produced a promis-
ing result. Moreover, it is planned to extend the statistical analysis work by using 
advanced statistical analysis algorithms. 
Finally, it is planned to use the analysis frame work to analyse paid Google Play 
and alternative third party applications. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
51 
The vulnerabilities of android applications were quantified and measured using vul-
nerability metrics. The metrics were identified by surveying multiple research papers 
and closely studying the android system. The analysis framework extracted security 
parameters and settings from multiple levels (manifest file , dex file , app resources 
and app store meta-data) of android applications in order to quantify and measure 
android vulnerabilities. 
The framework was used to analyse the vulnerabilities of 632 financial and medical 
applications. A statistical analysis on the metrics data revealed that 22% of the appli-
cations in the repository left their components open and accessed a seizable number of 
protected android resources. Furthermore, discrete statistics analysis on the metrics 
revealed a linear relationship between the number of implicit open components and 
the number of calls they make to the protected android methods. 
Finally, android applications category based analysis shows on average financial 
applications make more over-privileged permissions request, leave more components 
implicitly open and have more permission re-delegation vulnerability compared to 
medical applications. However , medical applications found to posses the maximum 
number of all the vulnerabilities mentioned. 
Appendices 
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Appendix A 
Package Names 
A.l Medical Category 
Package names of the top free Medical category apps used in the research : 
1 com.sigmaphone. topmedfree 
2 com.epocrates 
3 com.speedAnatomy.speedAnatomyLite 
4 com.vimtec.apps.remedies 
5 com.medscape.android 
6 independent.android .medicine. dictionary 
7 com.hssn.anatomyfree 
8 com.thomson.druginfo 
9 com.luckyxmobile. babycare 
10 com.hrfy 
11 com.remind4u2.sounds.of.rain 
12 com.usa.health.ifitness.firstaid 
13 MyPregnancy.res 
14 com.roidapp.sexfacts 
15 com.max.Anatomy 
16 com.mingtian.sound 
17 com.mobisystems.msdict.embedded.wireless.mcgrawhill.ndh2011 
18 com.ecare.ovulationcalculator 
19 com.mininurse.fyi 
20 com.skyhealth.glucosebuddyfree 
21 com.egoclean.amipregnant 
22 com.phonegap.getpregnant 
23 com.skyscape.android. ui 
24 com. heal th5c. android. pillidentifier. ui 
25 com.aitype.android. theme.ezreader 
26 atclic.android.en.babycounter .free 
27 com. Good willEnterpriseDevelopment .Anatronica 
28 com.express_scripts.mobile.member 
29 com.medicaljoyworks. prognosis 
30 com.szyk.myheart 
31 com.qxrnd.calculate 
32 com.remind4u2.sounds.of.ocean 
33 tattoo.designs_for _ women.darwin 
34 com.clinical.quicklabreference 
35 com.nooglesoft .drugindex 
36 com. baviux. pillreminder 
37 DOCECG2.doctor 
54 
38 com.remind4u2 .sounds. babies. bedtime.lullaby 
39 com.sa.orgasmsounds 
40 net.feathertech. pregnancystages 
41 com.zocdoc.android 
42 com. ianhanni ballake. contractiontimer 
43 org. hesperian. safepregnancyand birth 
44 com.max.HumanBodyFacts 
45 com.uptodate.android 
46 com.mobisystems.msdict.embedded.wireless.mcgrawhill.ems 
4 7 com.mtlab. utilities.duedatecalc 
48 com. whisperarts.kids. breastfeeding 
49 com.earthfl.are.android.medhelper.lite 
50 com. hi ppoandfriends .hel pdiabetes 
51 com.enfamil.eb 
52 com.jardogs.fmhmobile 
53 com. ablet. anatomyfl.ashcards 
54 gov.ahrq.epss 
55 com.delayr.diary.lite 
56 com.ablet.nursingfl.ashcards 
57 com.garland.medminderfree 
58 lam.momsapps.fetalultrasound 
59 com.goodrx 
60 com.focusmedica.essentail.atlas 
61 tattoo.designs_for_men.darwin 
62 com.wMedicalTerminology 
63 com.jonsap.ivinfusioncalc 
64 com.ecare.menstrualdiary 
65 net.palmdoc.drugdz 
66 PregnancyCalendar.res 
67 com.cherryCode.daltonismo 
68 eu.ipix.NativeMedAbbrevEN 
69 women.hairstyles.darwin 
70 com.irtza.abginterpreter 
71 com.findacode.free.icd 
72 ru.fedr. pregnancy 
73 home.activity 
7 4 com.MedApps.PillReminder 
55 
75 com.mo bisystems. msdict. embedded. wireless. elsevier. paa 
76 com.focusmedica.md.medicalhealthdictionary 
77 com. thomson.druginteractions 
78 com.usbmis.reader.mpr 
79 com. medicalj oywor ks. prognosis. cardiology 
80 blackdroid.anatomy 
81 com.ekgmaster.angeldog 
82 com.ani.apps.phobia.names 
83 com.greatcall.medcoach 
84 com.mobisystems.msdict.embedded.wireless.mcgrawhill.ivdh 
85 com.wellpoint.consumer.ABCBS 
86 com. androiddevelopermx. blogspot. bonefree 
87 com.lcs.mmp.lite 
88 org.Immunizationed.Shots 
89 com.focusmedica.md.cardiology 
90 com.DTsEMT .DripRateCalc 
91 gov.nih.nlm.sis.lactmed 
92 Drugs.res 
93 com. TruApps.antimosquito 
94 com. mo bisystems. msdict. embedded. wireless. elsevier. dor landsmedical 
95 com.jsolutionssp.ring 
96 com.sharecare.sos 
97 com.mobisystems.msdict.embedded.wireless.mcgrawhill.cpdr2011 
98 appinventor. aLiappodium. acne_ treatment 
99 com.mobisystems.msdict.embedded.wireless.mcgrawhill.drugoverdose 
100 com.ipremiumapps.icd9cm.lite 
101 com.appmakr.app590586 
102 com.hiddenbrains.dispensary.screen 
103 com.mobilebeez.human.body.facts 
104 com. smartmedicalapps. checklist 
105 Remedies.Home 
106 com.sccm.guidelines 
107 com.genericpedia.genericpedia 
108 com.mobisystems.msdict.embedded.wireless.mcgrawhill.engspmedical 
109 mobi.firedepartment 
110 NursingCalculators.res 
111 com.medicaljoyworks. prognosis.diabetes 
112 com.glic.group.ga.mobile 
113 com.medpagetoday.medpage 
114 si.matejpikovnik.menstrual 
115 com.pharmacylabvalues 
116 com.VetApps.VetCalc 
117 it . parisi. ecgguideJi te 
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118 com. winterchery. apps. ayurcare. activity 
119 com.ablet.nclexrnflashcards 
120 com.quantiaco.quantiamd 
121 com.itsoftgroup.medicine 
122 com.mobisystems.msdict.embedded.wireless.mcgrawhill.csg 
123 org. hom physiology. neuroslice 
124 com.hrfy.immunityboosters 
125 com.graphilos. baby log 
126 Pedcall.Calculator 
127 com.mingtian. HeartRate 
128 com.focusmedica. md. neurologyand psychiatry 
129 com.mobisystems.msdict.embedded. wireless.elsevier. muscularsystem 
130 air.AnatomyStarBrain 
131 cpr.cpr 
132 com.ear lybirdsoftware. contraction timer 
133 net .imaios.eanatomy 
134 com.hcsc.android. providerfinderil 
135 com.ircad . VisiblePatient.full 
136 com.samliyan.cardio 
137 com.doximity.amiondroid 
138 com.deity. predict gender 
139 inutilsoft.ADHDTest 
140 uk.co.pocketapp.pocketdoctor.lite 
141 com.a70633275950293c0e440725a.a82451242a 
142 com.babyplaning 
143 it .parisi.heartsounds 
144 com.mavro.police.lite 
145 com.froggyware.froggysnooze.li te 
146 com.mobisystems.msdict.embedded.wireless.elsevier.naturalmedicine 
147 com.weedfinder 
148 com.mobisystems.msdict.embedded.wireless.mcgrawhill.cem 
149 anatomyQuiz.res 
150 com.theora.MedLog 
151 net.medhand.pdr 
152 co.uk.devjet.biochem 
153 com.trainey.nurse 
154 com.insyncapp.guidehomeo 
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155 com.clusor.ice 
156 com. wonggordon. bgmonitor 
157 com.mobisystems.msdict.embedded.wireless.elsevier.jablonski 
158 pepid.android 
159 com.healthtap.mdhtexpress 
160 com.sombreromobile.p123free 
161 com.mfs.makeuptips 
162 com.apptray.pregnancytests 
163 jaguArt.iVaccine 
164 N ad Soft. CleanN oiseFREE 
165 com. thomson.compatibility 
166 or g. fruct . yar. blood pressurediary 
167 com.pcp.stutterhelp 
168 com.revsoft.doctormole 
169 org.carolinas.android.dir 
170 com.ablet.medicalwords 
171 com. mo bisystems. msdict. embedded. wireless. mcgraw hill. cmd t20 13 
172 com.intelligentmedicalobjects 
173 com.squaremed.diabetesplus.typ1 
174 com.epic.haiku.android 
175 com.visualdx.android 
176 com.wStop YourDrugAddiction 
177 com.cellavision.cellatlas 
178 com. uqu.ophthalmology 
179 com.realcme 
180 com.focusmedica .md.hematology 
181 com.pt.antimosquito 
182 com.draken.dosage 
183 org. bicou.grossesse 
184 com.appsbar.NCLEXRNPremium216947 
185 com.instanceone.rx4less 
186 co.uk.emed 
187 eu.ipix.LexMedEN 
188 inutilsoft . Color Blindness Test 
189 com.ircad .VisiblePatientLite 
190 trc.nmcd 
191 com.siyami.apps.an 
192 com.wellapps.gimonitor 
193 com.health.refresher 
194 com. texterity.android.Pediatrics 
195 com.a197125195950145ea8e6f793a.a29742337a 
196 com. mo bisystems. msdict. embedded. wireless. mcgraw hill. hand bookofpediatrics 
197 com.jonsap.NurseCalcsTrial 
198 com.thomson.cxn 
199 de.ritterit.ems.gui 
200 net.klier.blutdruck 
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201 com.limmercreative.srtengine.lastminute.emt 
202 com.focusmedica.md.ophthalmology 
203 com.snorlax 
204 Dardiries.MSE.MSE1 
205 com.freerange360.mpp.carathan 
206 com.ashwin.apnea 
207 com.ipremiumapps.icd10cm.lite 
208 ru.lopotun.android.laborContractionsCalc 
209 medical. druginteraction 
210 com. mobil tal. honestDiscounts 
211 com. hcsc. android . providerfindertx 
212 com. easyfirstaidguide. blacksmi th_software 
213 com.myprograms.glasgow 
214 com.siyami. apps. patientregister 
215 com.rx30.refillrx 
216 org.epstudios.epmobile 
217 com.socialbraingymlite 
218 com.wellpoint .consumer.ABC 
219 com.cjriverstone.apps.Rx:Time 
220 com. ubm. pt. app.clinicalscalesv2 
221 com.sidiary.app 
222 com.focusmedica.md.gynecology 
223 com.nikolay.arfa.fire 
224 com.scionis.catalog 
225 com.libroscience. www.ctmri.light 
226 ch.schacherinformatik. pillreminder 
227 com. bim.medrss 
228 com.montunosoftware.dosecast 
229 com.wBipolarDisorderUncovered 
230 com.pyxismobile.SentaraMyChart.ui.activity 
231 com.weed.manual 
232 com.mediafly. android. autismspeaks 
233 com.enchroma.cvd_test 
234 com. gi vewaygames. color blind_ads 
235 info.mikuro.cprmetronome 
236 botijo.online.doctor 
237 com.myprograms.dopamine 
238 howto becomea. nursing. assistant 
239 com.innovative.medicare 
240 com.rbo 
241 com.anchor.niemt 
242 org.aap 
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243 com.mytabway.anatomyfiashcardslite 
244 com.getthebabybasics. baby basics. trial 
245 com. b bi .na tionaLmul ti ple_sclerosis_society 
246 net.winrx.rx_2_go 
247 infinix.soft 
248 com.mgonullu.pgcalc 
249 com. thomson. pediatrics 
250 com. usbmis. troposphere.mycme 
251 com.doctor.radiogeng 
252 com.cco.android.inpractice.oncology 
253 com.dignityhealth.strosedominicanhospital 
254 com.sheridan.ash 
255 com.PerfectServe. Clinician 
256 com.leolandau.YogaNidraFree 
25 7 com. softcervical. cervicalexercises 
258 com.mavro.pt.lite 
259 com.cyberandsons. tcmaidtrial 
260 net.artvisual.settimani 
261 com.wr.acurhythm 
262 com.AudioDigest 
263 com.dipandro.nqlv1 
264 com. usbmis. troposphere.clinad 
265 RadiologiaFree.Doctor 
266 com.usablenet.android.ibx 
267 an.PharmEbook 
268 men.hairstyles.darwin 
269 ParasitologiaFree.Doctor 
270 com.enifyservices.MDS.Anemia.Free 
271 com.crowdcompass.sccm2013 
272 com.labcorp.mobile. beacon 
273 com.remind4u2.office.workout.exercises 
274 com.plastic.nose.job 
275 com.cellavant.abeocoder 
276 com.diablo.dentistpro 
277 com.a1373617662501724610f5f65a.a55440909a 
278 org.csgeeks.swpractice 
279 com.doximity.doximitydroid 
280 com.dtsemtrsicalc 
281 com.icare.visiontestapp 
282 project .Medic.Main 
283 com.ipremiumapps.icdcm.lite 
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284 com.limmercreative.srtengine.lastminute.paramedic 
285 com. dreizehn3 7. wehenschrei ber 
286 BacteriologiaFree.Doctor 
287 com.mydiabeteshome.medsimple 
288 com.rememberme 
289 org.bsava.formulary 
290 PsiquiatriaFree.Doctor 
291 com.agilemedicine.sbsn 
292 appinventor.aLinfo.Hack_My _Network 
293 com.mobilebeez.hairfall 
294 com.dm3photo52 
295 com.germanriano.writeandtalk 
296 com.mytabway.nursingfiashcardslite 
297 com.bpd 
298 ru.sabmakc.medication 
299 com.librotecstar. plantas.AOTUZCBHNVPBUH GW 
300 or g. tonee. teeth 
301 com.amcom.MEClient 
302 com.mdt.mdcoder 
303 com.szyk.diabetes 
304 com.acidremap.cardinalglennon 
305 com.biology.quizpro 
306 com.ipremiumapps.hcpcs.lite 
307 com.a5software.femi 
308 com.acidremap. paramedicprotocolprovider. agency 
309 com.e3datasolutions. bluecard 
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A.2 Finance Category 
Package names of the top free Finance category apps used in the research : 
1 com.handyapps.tipnsplit 
2 com.paypal.android.p2pmobile 
3 com.mint 
4 com.intuit.mobile.taxcaster 
5 com.usaa.mobile.android.usaa 
6 com.wf.wellsfargomobile 
7 com.infonow.bofa 
8 com.geico.mobile 
9 com.intuit.instantreturn 
10 com.chase.sig.android 
11 com.netgate 
12 com.google.android.apps.finance 
13 com. americanexpress. android. acctsvcs. us 
14 com.pnc.ecommerce.mobile 
15 com.citi .citimobile 
16 com.navyfederal.android 
17 com.regions.mobbanking 
18 com.fidelity.android 
19 com.statefarm.pocketagent 
20 com.adp.run.mobile 
21 com.intuit.mobile.mytaxrefund 
22 com.suntrust.mobilebanking 
23 INGDIRECT.android 
24 com.expensemanager 
25 com.higherone.mobile.android 
26 com.etrade.mobilepro.activity 
27 com.dayspringtech.envelopes 
28 com. phonevalley. progressive 
29 com.yahoo.mobile.client.android.finance 
30 com.bloomberg.android 
31 com. pnc. ecommerce. mobile. vw. android 
32 com. pocketools.currency 
33 com.handyapps.easymoney 
34 com.rushcard.android 
35 com.firstniagara 
36 com.intuit.quicken 
37 com.barclaycardus 
38 org.dayup.stocks 
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39 com.cardinalcommerce.greendot 
40 com. experianinteracti ve. mycredi tscore 
41 com.tdameritrade.mobile3 
42 com.vanguard 
43 com.junobe.android.junowallet 
44 com.konylabs.Scottrade 
45 com.HRB.EmeraldCard 
46 com.schwab.mobile 
47 com.woodforest 
48 com.hrblock.AtHome_l040EZ 
49 net. taobits.officecalculator .android 
50 com.esurance.app 
51 gov.irs 
52 com.fiserv.touchbankingasp 
53 com.android.stock 
54 com. wageworks.ezreceipts 
55 com.cnbc.client 
56 com. mo bileappsresearch. stockwatcher 
57 com.bbva.compass 
58 com.key.android 
59 com.mobill.app 
60 com.jacksonhewitt.mobile 
61 com.mfoundry.mb. android.mb__BMO H071 025661 
62 ShareBuilderMobile.android 
63 com. evan char 1 ton. mileage 
64 com.intuit.eitc 
65 com.snapwork.finance 
66 com.bookmark.money 
67 com.tio.pge 
68 com. payrollguru. paycheckcalculator .free 
69 com.kitco.android.free.activities 
70 com.xoom.android.app 
71 org.me.mobiexpensifyg 
72 com.htsu.hsbcpersonalbanking 
73 com. devexperts. tdmo bile. platform. android. ameri trade 
7 4 com.charterone.androidapp 
75 com.andromo.dev42956.app76649 
76 com.cousinHub.widget 
77 com.afcu.mobilebanking 
78 tip.calculator 
79 com.quoterocket.auto 
80 com.Vertifi.DeposZip.P314089681 
81 com.softek.ofxclmobile.macu 
82 com.handynorth.moneywise_free 
83 com.sigterm 
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84 com. nationwide. mobile. android .nwmo bile 
85 com.arvest.androidapp 
86 com.quickenloans.mortgagecalculator 
87 com.goldenl.mobilebanking 
88 nitezh.ministock 
89 com.venmo 
90 com.nbc.cnbc.pro.mobile 
91 com.ifs .banking.fiid1085 
92 com.associatedbank.mobilebanking 
93 com.ifree.coinkeeper 
94 com. thirdframestudios.android.expensoor 
95 com.Vertifi.Mobile.P211391825 
96 talking.toy.funny.couple 
97 com.sawhney.taxmode 
98 com.kanda.pro.taxcalc 
99 com.netdonkeylabs.NDL_Cashfiow 
100 com.sigfig.sigfig 
101 com.creditsesame 
102 com.q2e.citadel5012android.citadelmobile.uwnmobile 
103 com.spectrl.ppcalc 
104 com.principal.mobile 
105 com.ml.mobile.mymerrill 
106 com. brisk.j pay 
107 com.clairmail.dsfcu.prod 
108 com.CashKing 
109 com.bankofamerica.health 
110 org.mygreatlakes. borrower .mobile 
111 com.comerica.mobilebanking 
112 com. terrylau.goldsilvermonitor 
113 org.schoolsfirstfcu.mobile 
114 org.municipal.mobile 
115 com.mcom.firstcitizens 
116 bokf.ib.android.market.bok 
117 com.dfckc.afb 
118 com.mobile.asb 
119 com.monitise.mmb.client.android.USBankReliaCard 
120 com.mshift.android.alaskausa 
121 com.clairmail.sccu.mbanking 
122 com.ifs.mobilebanking.fiid5345 
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123 com.mcom.firstmerit 
124 com.crashtestdummylimited.militarypaycalculatorfree 
125 com.airkast.bloomberg.activity 
126 com.bloomberg.android.anywhere 
127 com.lmig.pm.internet.mobile.android.libertymutual 
128 com. al tsoldev. preciousmetal tracker 
129 wb.receipts 
130 com. easy. currency. extra. androary 
131 com.monitise.vcu.client 
132 com.ifs. androidmobilebanking.fiid3808 
133 com.zumobi.android.motleyfool 
134 com.jackhenry.Susquehanna 
135 com.salliemae.android 
136 com. devexperts. tdmo bile. platform. android. thinkorswim 
137 com.mstar 
138 com.dccu.mobilebanking 
139 com.Splitwise.SplitwiseMobile 
140 com.ifs.mobilebanking.fiid3500 
141 com. ignmo bile. gestorfinanceiroli te 
142 com.payfiex.healthhub 
143 com.wFreeCreditReportApp 
144 com.cashcrate_mobile 
145 com.mfoundry.mb.android.mb_zfnb_pb 
146 com.ifs. banking.fiid3337 
147 com.miteksystems.android.mobiledeposit.brandable.alaska 
148 com.fiserv.popmoney 
149 com.peak6.oh 
150 com.anishu.homebudget.lite 
151 com.fnbpa.mobile 
152 com.ifs. banking.fiid1359 
153 com.jpm.sig.android 
154 com.q2e.unitedfcu5017android.ufcu.uwnmobile 
155 com.simplebudget 
156 com.pyxismobile.IDENTITYGUARD.ui.activity 
157 com.sdccu.mobilebanking 
158 com.mshift.fairwindscu 
159 app.kwc.math. totalcalc 
160 com.nclud.hellowallet 
161 com.firsttechfed.mobile 
162 com.ifs. banking.fiid3364 
163 com.synovus.mobilebanking 
164 com.kpmoney.android 
165 com.ootpapps.saving.made.simple 
166 org.secumd.m.prod 
167 com.pfinance 
168 com.t2.t2expense 
169 com.kickinglettuce.debtplanner 
170 com.ifs.mobilebanking.fiid9094 
171 com.smartypig.app 
172 com.softek.ofxclmobile.virginiacu 
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173 com.softek.ofxclmobile.lakemichigancu 
174 com.tio.epe 
175 com.zumobi .msnmoney 
176 com.dfckc.abmw 
177 com.bottleworks.dailymoney 
178 com.mcom.firstcitizenssc 
179 com.clearcheckbook.app 
180 com.ifs. androidmobilebanking.fiid3503 
181 com.mshift.android.patelco 
182 net.metaquotes .metatrader4 
183 com.mea.activities 
184 com.dfckc.abco 
185 com.freddyt.foodassistancebuddy 
186 com.pmcu.mobile 
187 com.q2e.firstfinancial3268 .fibmobile.uwnmobile 
188 org.members1st.mobile 
189 com.pnc.ecommerce.mobile.finder 
190 si .matej pikovnik. wor kinghours 
191 com.msf.opx 
192 com.aonhewitt.ysa.reimburseme 
193 com.ing.rs.ingretire 
194 com.mfoundry.mb.android.mb_493 
195 org.genisyscu.mobile 
196 org.wescom.ibranch 
197 com.sisoft.in 
198 com.ifs.banking.fiid5362 
199 org.msufcu.mobile 
200 com.clairmail.greatwesternbank 
201 application.mBanking 
202 com.andromo. dev89103.app90583 
203 com.ifs. banking.fiid5039 
204 com.mshift.android.iccuv2 
205 com.ifs. banking.fiid3423 
206 com.aol.mobile.dailyFinance 
207 com. unidevsol u tions. timesheet 
208 com.mfoundry.mb. android.mb_140 
209 org.onenevada.MobileBanking 
210 com.scotiabank.mobile 
211 com.homes.mortgagecalculator 
212 com.dwolla.dwolla 
213 com.ent.mobile 
214 com.finicity.mvelopes 
215 com.bookkeeper 
216 com.mshift.trumark 
217 com.ifs.mobilebanking.fiid8105 
218 com.myappengine.pffcu 
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219 com. softek. ofxclmo bile. partnersfcu 
220 kcast.android.widget 
221 com.scbt.mobile 
222 com.plastyc .android.v2 
223 com. ifs . androidmo bile banking. fiid3023 
224 com.malauzai.BBCN 
225 com.chickenbrickstudios.mm2 
226 org.grow.mobile 
227 com.cacu 
228 org.baxter.mobile 
229 com.greenshades.mobile1 
230 com.police.scanner. radar.hunter 
231 com.bethpagefcu.m.prod 
232 com.ifs .mobilebanking.fiid3164 
233 com.kaloersoftware. balancesandbudgets 
234 com.mfoundry.mb.android.mb_osidna180 
235 com.divum.MoneyControl 
236 com.adore. usa 
237 com.fas 
238 com.midflorida.mobile.branch 
239 ru.mw 
240 com.droid4you.application. wallet 
241 com. mshift. android. americanair linescu 
242 com. nets pend. product . android . bet 
243 com.mshift. easternbank 
244 com.smartw ho. Smart All CurrencyConverter 
245 com.mshift.fccu 
246 com.mshift .android.robinsfcu 
247 an.program.mymoney 
248 com.mfoundry.mb.android.mb_abt_pb 
249 com. mshift. android. dfcu 
250 atws.app 
251 com.dollarbank.onlinebanking 
252 badpiggies.sexpositions.sheontop 
253 br.com.epx.andro12c 
254 com.ifs. banking.fiid7140 
255 com.ifs.banking.fiid7177 
256 com.forex.forextrader 
257 com.wFreeCreditScore1 
258 com.jackhenry.ORNLFederalCU 
259 com.TipCalc 
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260 com.ifs.androidmobilebanking.fiid3379 
261 com.softek.ofxclmobile. publixemployeesfcu 
262 com.Vertifi.DeposZip.P263182794 
263 com.mfoundry.mb.android.mb_CB143 
264 com.ifs. banking.fiid3160 
265 com.stellar.debtsfree 
266 de.schildbach.wallet 
267 com.mshift.langleyfcu 
268 com.pinpoint.mobile 
269 com.statefarm.steerclear 
270 com.snapwork.hdfc 
271 org.rcu.deposit 
272 com. terrylau.goldsilvercalfree 
273 com.fcb.mobilebanking 
27 4 com.rifiexo. tradeinterceptormobile 
275 com.ifs. banking.fiid3465 
276 com.ifs.mobilebanking.fiid3919 
277 or g. teachersfcu.mobile 
278 ru.qrcheck.passbook 
279 com. progressusmedia. bankruptcy helper 
280 com.ifs. banking.fiid3399 
281 com.ipacc.android 
282 com.molovi.checkbook. trial 
283 com.jackhenry.IberiaBank 
284 com.mshift.android.royalcu 
285 com.firstinterstatebank.mobile.android 
286 com.ifs. banking.fiid3836 
287 com.monitise.mmb.client.android.USBankAccelaPay 
288 info. percentagecalculator 
289 tubin.debts 
290 org.eglin.ibranch 
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291 org.bellco.m.prod 
292 com.softek.ofxclmobile.northwestfcu 
293 mediavision.handwallet 
294 com. clairmail.launcher. android. umb banking 
295 com.ifs. banking.fiid8061 
296 com.phonegap.scentsypay 
297 org.sacu.mobile 
298 com. softek. ofxclmo bile. calcoastcu 
299 com.ifs.mobilebanking.fiid3556 
300 baker.nick.gascalc 
301 com.ifs.mobilebanking.fiid5334 
302 com.moneyowl 
303 com.ifs.banking.fiid8027 
304 com.prestamos.calc 
305 org.keesler.mobile 
306 com.malauzai.ffin 
307 com.sweypro.driverdiary 
308 com.cnbok 
309 com.Vertifi.DeposZip 
310 com.ifs.banking.fiid3561 
311 com.mshift.bankplus2go 
312 org.ucreditu.mobile.jwaala 
313 com. DsquareAndroid. Tax Calc 
314 bokf.ib.android.market.bot 
315 com.ifs.banking.fiid5091 
316 com.kaiku.mobile 
317 com.pinnbank.MobileNebraska 
318 br.com.carango 
319 com. mfoundry. mb. android .mb_cfcu 
320 com.softek.ofxclmobile.goldenwestcu 
321 com.softek.ofxclmobile. wsecu 
322 bigfrogsoftware.ez. tipcalculator 
323 com.andromo.dev17163.app53431 
Appendix B 
Implementation Tools and Scripts 
B.l Third-Party Tools 
1. android-market-api - http : I I code . go ogle. com/p/android-market-api/ 
2. Androguard - http: I I code . google. com/p/ androguard/ 
3. apktool- http: I /code. google. com/p/android-apktool/ 
B.2 Implemented Tools and Scripts 
• Java based Tools 
1. Crawler- http: I /met-mobile. bu. edu/appsecureanalysis/Framework/ 
MarketData 
2. ManifestReader- http: I /met-mobile. bu. edu/appsecureanalysis/F-
ramework/ManifestReader 
3. Keywords - http: I /met-mobile. bu. edu/appsecureanalysis/Framewo-
rk/Keywords 
• P ython scripts - http : I /met-mobile. bu. edu/appsecureanalysis/Framework/ 
androguard-ext/ 
1. Over Privileged_extractor. py 
2. ReDelegation_extractor. py 
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3. CodeLoading_extractor. py 
4. HiddenFiles_extractor. py 
5. database.py 
• MySql scripts - http : //met-mobile. bu. edu/appsecureanalysis/Framewo-
rk/MySql 
• R scripts - http : //met-mobile. bu . edu/ appsecureanalysis/Framework/R 
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